2,263 research outputs found

    Ten questions about the subprime crisis.

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    The ongoing credit crunch represents the fi rst crisis of the age of mass securitization. One conclusion sometimes drawn is that the costs of securitization, in the form of risks to fi nancial stability, exceed the benefits. The implication is that we should return to the simpler days when commercial banks originate loans to households and fi rms and hold them on their balance sheets, rather than slicing them, dicing them and selling them off. But this back-to-the-future formula ignores economic realities. Securitization is bound up with the broader deregulation of fi nancial markets and with the information-technology revolution. Policy makers cannot eliminate this process short of reimposing the kind of restrictive regulation to which banking and fi nancial systems were subject half a century ago.liquidity lines provided by financial institutions. Market liquidity depends not only on objective, exogenous factors, but also on endogenous market dynamics. Central banks responsible for systemic stability need to consider how far their traditional responsibility for the health of the banking system needs to be adapted to promote stability in the relevant financial markets. In any case, turning back the clock would not be desirable because the constellation of financial innovations referred to as securitization has real benefits for the economy. Those innovations have allowed the financial system to repackage and spread risk. They have reduced the amount of equity capital that this system requires to absorb that risk. The result has been to lower funding costs for both fi rms and homeowners as a class. In the aftermath of the Great Securitization Crisis of 2007-8, would-be reformers will surely say that financial regulators need to rethink speed limits and rules of the road. In my view, policy makers should focus on the banking system. Banks still play a unique role. They are at the center of the information-impacted segments of the financial system. Their key role and their vulnerability are recognized by the protection they receive via the financial safety net. Re-thinking should start with the role of Basel II, and within Basel II of the role of internal models and bond ratings.

    Emotions in Deaf and Hard-of-Hearing and Typically Hearing Children

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    For deaf and hard-of-hearing (DHH) children living in an environment where their access to linguistic input and social interactions is compromised, learning emotions could be difficult, which may further affect social functioning. To understand the role of emotion in DHH children’s social life, this study investigated emotional functioning (i.e., emotion recognition, empathy, emotion expression), and its relation with social functioning (i.e., social competence and externalizing behaviors), in 55 DHH children and 74 children with typical hearing (aged 3–10 years; M_{age} = 6.04). Parental reports on children’s emotional and social functioning and factors related to DHH children’s hearing were collected. Results showed similar levels of emotional and social functioning in children with and without hearing loss. Use of auditory intervention and speech perception did not correlate with any measures in DHH children. In both groups, higher levels of empathy related to higher social competence and fewer externalizing behaviors; emotion recognition and positive emotion expression were unrelated to either aspect of social functioning. Higher levels of negative emotion expression related to lower social competence in both groups, but to more externalizing behaviors in DHH children only. DHH children in less linguistically accessible environments may not have adequate knowledge for appropriately expressing negative emotions socially

    Asian Currency Baskets: An Answer in Search of a Question?

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    10.1007/s11079-007-9064-2Open Economies Review203403-42

    Banking union in historical perspective: the initiative of the European Commission in the 1960s-1970s

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    This article shows that planning for the organization of EU banking regulation and supervision did not just appear on the agenda in recent years with discussions over the creation of the eurozone banking union. It unveils a hitherto neglected initiative of the European Commission in the 1960s and early 1970s. Drawing on extensive archival work, this article explains that this initiative, however, rested on a number of different assumptions, and emerged in a much different context. It first explains that the Commission's initial project was not crisis-driven; that it articulated the link between monetary integration and banking regulation; and finally that it did not set out to move the supervisory framework to the supranational level, unlike present-day developments
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